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Four strikes and you’re out: Adidas covering
their bases with trade marks protection
William van Caenegem and Violet Atkinson BOND UNIVERSITY
Takeaway tips
• When considering whether a registered mark is
used “as a mark” or merely as a decorative feature,
evidence that consumers have become accustomed
to seeing trade marks in the same position on
products of that kind will support a finding of use
as a mark.
• Even if the registered trade mark consists of three
stripes, and is well-known among consumers, four
stripes can be held to be deceptively similar if they
are placed in a similar configuration.
• It is the similarity in the overall configuration of
the stripes rather than the number that is crucial in
the test of deceptive similarity.
• In essence, the test of deceptive similarity requires
a comparison of the marks themselves, but “rel-
evant context” can also be taken into account, in
particular what the marks are applied to, and the
circumstances in which the marks will be observed
and compared.
• Survey evidence that is not “ecologically valid”
and evidence tending to show only a general
intention to “sail close to the wind” is of little
assistance to the court.
Introduction: the evolution from trade mark
to fashion statement
In this article, we revisit the decision in Adidas AG
v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3)1 (Pacific
Brands) and make some comparative comments about
the analogous South African decision in Adidas AG
v Pepkor Retail Ltd2 (Pepkor). We address these deci-
sions in the context of the spate of infringement actions
brought by Adidas around the world in relation to its
three stripes trade mark, and some background fashion
trends. The most recent trigger for our interest is the
litigation between Adidas and Puma in relation to the
evoPower soccer boot.3 Not long before, Adidas also
took on Barcelona Football Club in relation to the
striped design of its shirts.4 There have also been reports
of Adidas preventing Tesla from pursuing a three stripes
design in a trade mark application for goods including
caps among others.5
In Australia, Adidas owns a number of three stripes
registered trade marks, in particular for the short three
stripes positioned on the side of sports boots and shoes,
and a more elongated pattern running along the outside
of the sleeves of shirts and jackets, and also along the
sides of shirts, pants, shorts and skirts.6
Any competing producer of sports apparel using three
stripes, and even two or four stripes, may expect to
trigger some reaction from Adidas. Some important
legal questions with broad policy implications are high-
lighted by this circumstance. The first legal issue is what
constitutes “use of a mark as a mark” if a registered sign
performs both an aesthetic (and say “fashion”) function
and a badge of origin function. The second issue is that
of deceptive similarity in trade marks law, in particular
in circumstances where there is an arguably obvious
difference between the well-known registered mark and
the impugned mark (ie competitors using a different
number of stripes).
Adidas is a longstanding sportswear brand that has
now snuck its way into the closets of sporting individu-
als and fashionistas alike. Minimalism, streetwear and
sports luxe, the hallmark “trends” of the 2010–20 era,
adopt sportswear brands as a necessary element. Further
consolidating these brands as fashionable entities are
collaborations with high-end designers and celebrities.
Adidas’s highly successful collaborations with
Stella McCartney7 and Kanye West (Yeezy)8 have breathed
new life and a contemporary “cool” culture into a brand
that might otherwise be left in the sportswear box. These
collaborations, attuned to trends and mixed with fresh
designs, have resulted in Adidas being voted as the most
relevant brand of 2016 (beating Gucci and Nike) on
Highsnobiety, a very popular blog and magazine that
reports on streetwear trends.9 Adidas is now considered
fashion, and with this comes a renewed desire to take
steps to protect their intellectual property. The company
is not alone in pursuing this evolution from sports to
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fashion brand, and its trade mark’s transmogrification
from badge of origin to artistic design. Arch rival Puma
(itself also on the receiving end of three stripes litiga-
tion) was recently reported to be suing Forever 21 in
relation to look-alikes from Rihanna’s Fenty x Puma
line. They are accused of trading “upon the substantial
goodwill of Puma, Rihanna, and the Fenty shoes”.10
The “badge-function”: use of a mark as a
mark — Adidas Australia
Its win against Pacific Brands must be a comfort to
Adidas whose approach, as we explain above, is exactly
to combine origin and aesthetic brand functions —
thereby establishing an element of monopoly in the
appearance of its footwear and garments on the coattails
of exclusive rights in its registered mark.
The court in Pacific Brands focused on the position-
ing of the impugned marks and concluded that anything
that appears between the laces and the sole of a sports
shoe would be perceived by consumers as being there to
perform a trade mark function. The court pointed out
that in this product segment, many producers placed
their marks in exactly that position — teaching consum-
ers to expect to see a badge of origin there. The court
thereby trenched between opposing experts. Dr Stavros,
an associate professor in marketing who was called by
Adidas, offered the opinion that consumers are indeed
conditioned to view such markings as brand elements.
However, for the respondent, Dr Glaser, a retired emeri-
tus professor of management, argued that these mark-
ings may simply serve to enable the consumer to
categorise the shoes’ “function and did not necessarily
have a brand association”.11
A key difference between the parties related to the
matters of context (ie other than the resemblance of the
marks themselves) that could be taken into account to
answer the question whether the respondent’s four
stripes were “used as a mark”. According to Adidas,
advocating for a narrow enquiry, the only material facts
were that “logos serving as a badge of origin were
traditionally placed on the sides of shoes between the
sole and the laces as this space was visible from
numerous angles”.12 In other words:
The fact that the side of sports shoes were used as a place
to display trade marks was a permissible matter of context,
or perhaps “trade usage” as referred to in s 219 of the
[Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)].13
Context was not the open-ended inquiry into all the
surrounding circumstances that the respondent Pacific
Brands called for, because “whether there was use as a
trade mark could not depend on the present or ‘typical’
circumstances of sale, which may change”.14 The court
agreed with Adidas on this point. This narrow approach
was reiterated in the context of deceptive similarity.
How a typical consumer may actually come to their
purchasing decision in store, while highly relevant in
passing off cases, was not the correct inquiry in the
registered trade mark context (for instance therefore
excluding evidence that, aided by a sales assistant, it
would become clear to your average buyer that the four
stripes shoes were precisely not Adidas, or the fact that
Adidas shoes may be displayed on a separate marked
stand from other shoe brands).15
Evidence relevant to deceptive similarity —
Adidas Australia
With the matter of trade mark use having been given
short shrift, the court in Pacific Brands then moved on to
consider the differences between the impugned marks
and the registered three stripes mark. The judgment first
devotes attention to two issues: the relevance of inten-
tion and the probative value of survey evidence. The first
was ultimately irrelevant for two reasons: one, the court
construed the required intention very narrowly — effec-
tively, evidence was required of a subjective intention to
mislead consumers. The respondent had received com-
munications from Adidas concerning its various shoes;
in some cases it resisted the allegations of trade mark
infringement, in others it agreed to take the shoes off the
market. The inference the court drew from these facts
was that the respondent engaged upon an honest exer-
cise of determining what was on one side of the line and
what was on the other — not that staff acted with a
dishonest intent to mislead consumers and get away with
it. The court made little of the pattern of behaviour
(choosing to incorporate diagonal stripes in many of its
boots over time) or the level of resemblance itself
(which for three of the sneakers was held to be so great
as to constitute trade mark infringement). We comment
in more detail below on the court’s views about the
principle in Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton &
Co Ltd16 (Australian Woollen Mills) in this context.
In terms of the survey evidence, the applicant faced a
now familiar refrain in these types of cases: the structure
of the online survey did not replicate the purchasing
environment for the shoes in a realistic manner (in other
words, it was not ecologically valid), and the survey
question was a leading one in that it would lead the
surveyed persons to look for a branding element in what
might otherwise appear to be decorative features. Once
again, survey evidence was held to be of no relevance in
a case dependent upon proving consumer deception or
confusion.17
But in any case, the court insisted that it could make
the judgment required simply by engaging in the com-
parative, recollection based exercise the law requires —
unaided either by evidence of intention, or by extraneous
evidence other than that provided by the expert wit-
nesses.
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Deceptive similarity — how to compare
marks
In the final analysis, three of the 12 marks were held
to be infringing. Generally speaking, these were the least
“sporty” and the most ordinary daywear shoes of the 12.
The other shoes had more the appearance of “joggers” or
boots for ball sports or other athletic activity. The
infringing shoes were also women’s rather than men’s
shoes. The stripes on some of the impugned boots had
such an integrated structural or design character that
there may have been an argument that they did not
appear to be present on the boots for a “badge of origin”
purpose. However, the court took a global approach to
that question and did not consider it shoe-per-shoe, as it
did the deceptive similarity issue.
The first difficulty faced by the court was that each
impugned mark consisted of four rather than the Adidas
three stripes. In a few short passages, the court made and
justified some core decisions, at the outset saying that
the question of deceptive similarity in trade marks law
“depends on a combination of visual impression and
judicial estimation of the effect likely to be produced in
the course of the ordinary conduct of affairs” or is one of
“impression and common sense”.18
A trial judge is:
… entitled to give effect to his own opinion as to the
likelihood of deception or confusion and in doing so is not
confined to the evidence of the witnesses called at trial.19
Importantly, the court said: “In the present case the
dominant visual impression of the applicants’ trade
marks is not just stripes but three stripes in a different or
contrasting colour to the footwear.” Further, although
the court accepted that “the mark’s notoriety is rel-
evant”, it did not accept that “the fame of the mark has
the consequence in the present case that a four stripe
mark could never be deceptively similar to the appli-
cants’ trade marks”.20
Although the court accepted “that the average con-
sumer would not have forgotten the applicants’ trade
marks”, it did “not assume that the average consumer
would perfectly recollect the number of stripes”21 (empha-
sis added).
It is well-known that consideration of deceptive
similarity in trade marks law is at once broader and
narrower than the same issue as it arises in passing off.
Broader, in that to establish confusion is sufficient —
that a number of persons are caused to wonder as to the
origin of the goods will do; the ordinary consumer need
not come to an erroneous conclusion. Narrower in the
sense that all the circumstances are not necessarily to be
taken into account — at core, trade marks law requires
a comparison of the marks themselves; the question is
what relevant context can nonetheless be taken into
account in construing this comparative exercise (as it
was in relation to trade mark use, above). About that, the
court had this to say:
In my opinion, the issue being one of fact, what the relevant
context comprehends must vary with the marks in question,
to what those marks are applied, and the circumstances in
which the marks will be observed and compared.22
Price differences and the different character of pur-
chasers were to be given little weight as “the evidence
does not establish any clear differentiation between the
two when making the required comparison of the
marks”.23 Therefore:
On the facts of the present case, I give greatest weight to
the marks being used on shoes and to a purchaser of the
respondent’s shoes seeing them in the setting of a store and
being able to look at them in that setting.24
Having made these general observations, the court
then went on to consider each shoe in turn. For that
purpose, the statement included in the quote above that
“I accept that the average consumer would not have
forgotten the applicants’ trade marks but I do not assume
that the average consumer would perfectly recollect the
number of stripes”, has important implications. There is
no automatic ruling out of a four stripes sign as being
potentially deceptively similar. Despite the undoubted
fame of the Adidas three stripes mark, consumers might
still be uncertain in their recollection of the precise
number of stripes in the mark, and at the very least be
led to wonder (a low threshold) whether a four stripes
mark might signify a connection with Adidas. Adidas
was not made a victim of its own success; this provides
an interesting contrast with one of the South African
decisions considered below, where that was exactly the
result called for.
The court hinted in the passage above at the approach
it would ultimately adopt: to identify the essential
features or the “dominant visual impression” of the mark
and compare those with the impugned marks; thus, also
whether there were three or four stripes is not by itself
determinative because the positioning and relationship
of the stripes were so important. In relation to the first of
the infringing shoes, the court said the following:
I note in particular the parallel equidistant stripes of equal
width (with blue edgings) in a different or contrasting
colour to the footwear, running from the lacing area to the
instep area of the shoes.25
In a similar vein, the South African Appeal Court in
Pepkor said that it “is the configuration of the marks that
will impress itself upon the mind”.26
Taking the typical configuration of the Adidas trade
mark as the feature to search for in the impugned shoes,
only three showed a very precise match (the Airborne,
Stingray and Apple Pie). This was despite the fact that
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they showed an increasing variation in space between
the second and third stripes and some patterning on the
background material. The other shoes all displayed quite
prominent differences: clear striations running across the
three stripes or below, integration with structural fea-
tures of the shoe, differences in positioning and size, and
so on.
Australian Woollen Mills and the relevance
of intention
As to intention, the status of the principle held to be
“wholesome in tendency” in Australian Woollen Mills
attracted some helpful attention.27 In quite a number of
recent cases, the principle has had a very significant
impact: but what does it actually mean?
In Australian Woollen Mills, the High Court said
(against the background that intention is not a necessary
element for passing off or misleading and deceptive
conduct) that:
The rule that if a mark or get-up for goods is adopted for the
purpose of appropriating part of the trade or reputation of a
rival, it should be presumed to be fitted for the purpose and
therefore likely to deceive or confuse … is as just in
principle as it is wholesome in tendency.28
The essence of the approach emerges from the
following later sentence in the same case:
… when a dishonest trader fashions an implement or
weapon for the purpose of misleading potential customers
he at least provides a reliable and expert opinion on the
question whether what he has done is in fact likely to
deceive.29
It seems that intention to deceive will have to be
proven otherwise than by pointing to the similarity
between the brands.
In Pacific Brands, the essence of the applicant’s
evidence was that the respondent as successors in
business to a former licensee of Adidas was aware of the
considerable commercial success of products bearing
the three stripes marks; that the sequence of product
development together with the “strategy” to deal with
Adidas complaints demonstrated a conscious attempt to
create colourable variations on the three stripes mark
while retaining their essential features in an effort to
maintain plausible deniability of infringement, while
still suggesting the three stripes mark to consumers; and
that the respondent had copied other aspects of the
shoes, which was indicative of an intention to trade off
Adidas’s reputation, making them perceive some asso-
ciation between the three and four stripes marks.30
In the end, the court in Pacific Brands dealt with all
the intention related evidence curtly: here the intention
as it emerges from the evidence was to sail close to the
wind, that is “to come close to but to avoid infringe-
ment”.31 The court said “intention does not assist at a
general level”,32 seemingly requiring evidence of a
subjective intention in the mind(s) of employees to
“trade off the reputation of [A]didas in the 3-Stripe
Trade Marks by causing confusion between the mark on
the impugned shoes and the 3-Stripe trade marks”.33
Thus, the operation of the principle in Australian Wool-
len Mills was quite narrowly confined — it requires
concrete evidence of a dishonest intent to deceive
consumers. However, the river of Australian Woollen
Mills cannot rise above its source: the resemblance will
still have to be sufficient to justify the conclusion of
deceptive similarity. For most of the shoes in Pacific
Brands, that resemblance was simply not there accord-
ing to the court. It therefore dismissed the whole issue of
intention and application of Australian Woollen Mills,
and formed its own conclusion simply on the basis of the
comparative exercise within the parameters it had set.
Comparativeandpolicycomments—Adidas
South Africa
In the South African Adidas matter, Pepkor, the trial
decision was overturned by the Appeal Court. The
approach taken at the trial level is particularly interest-
ing from the perspective of the trend we identified
above, of companies moving from pure sports to fashion
and from badge of origin trade marking to trade mark
fashion designs. Judicial acceptance that a mark can be
used as a mark even if it also performs a design function
— is also intended to be visually appealing — benefits
trade mark owners of highly visible consumer brands.
But the inevitable result of blurring the lines between
visual appeal and semiotic function is that the mark is
given much more prominence: the mark is no longer
confined to its traditional box (eg on the label inside the
collar and perhaps a small brand on the top left panel of
a shirt).
One effect of the greater prominence of the mark as a
decorative feature (for example displayed largely and
multiple times across the front of a shirt) might be that
consumers become so familiar with, and so desirous of
the real mark, that even subtle (if that is what four versus
three stripes is) differences will be immediately noticed.
In that case, the trade mark owner would become the
victim of its own success.34 Thus, the mark’s prominence
had both negative and positive potential implications in
Pepkor. For trade mark use, the implications were
positive for Adidas on the basis that the four stripes of
the respondent were held by the Appeal Court to look
like they were performing a trade mark function because
consumers were so familiar with the Adidas stripes
performing that function.35 The court put it as follows:
As far as the factual enquiry is concerned, this Court said in
Verimark (Pty) Ltd v BMW AG; BMW AG v Verimark (Pty)
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Ltd, that for infringement it must be established that
consumers are likely to interpret the mark, as it is used by
the third party, as designating or tending to designate the
undertaking from which the third party’s goods originate.36
This was more likely if the impugned mark closely
resembled a reputed mark, as is implicit in this further
statement:
The consumer is used to manufacturers of sporting foot-
wear applying a variety of stripes to their products to
identify them (the adidas stripes are merely one example)
and there is no reason why the consumer would perceive
marks similar to the first appellant’s registered trademarks
to be merely embellishment or decoration.37
The relevant question in relation to trade mark use is
more practical and less conceptual than its Australian
equivalent, and is more favourable to the trade mark
owner, certainly where the mark has a strong and
widespread reputation.
But prominence can also work negatively against the
trade mark owner, as was apparent from the approach
taken by the Trial Court. Because consumers were so
familiar with the Adidas three stripes mark, they would
necessarily be alert to the difference when four stripes
appear on a boot.38 The court said as follows:
Since the Adidas 3-stripe mark has not only been advertised
by means of the sale of Adidas products in South Africa,
but also by means of promotion at sport events and in
movies screened in South African cinemas and on televi-
sion, there can be little doubt that the average South African
consumer of applicants’ goods would be sufficiently dis-
cerning to distinguish applicants’ trade mark from the 2 and
4 stripe combinations on shoes of respondent because
South African consumers associate international branded
shoes with a higher price category than shoes that are
branded by South African companies thereby making
allowance for import duties and related costs.
…
Applicant’s argument that their shoes are sold in South
Africa to a lower-socio economic group of consumers as
well who aspire to wearing their footwear may well be
correct.
It is however not correct to suggest that those consumers
are not able to distinguish applicants’ shoes from those of
respondents where the latter sells their shoes for a lesser
price with features different to that of applicants’ shoes,
namely 2 or 4 stripes with a device, name or brand label
different to that of applicants.39
In Pacific Brands, as we mentioned above, even
configurations that really did not appear like trade marks
but had some parallel-ish slanting stripes between laces
and sole were nonetheless held to perform a trade mark
function, even though they would arguably appear
structural, functional or decorative. The key was that
they were placed in a position where consumers expected
to see brands on shoes. In terms of the number of stripes,
adding or subtracting a stripe was held not to be enough
in itself to “get away with it” despite the fact that Adidas
famously has three stripes and not two or four. The court
had greater regard for the configuration of the stripes
than only for the number of stripes — the latter damned
Adidas in South Africa (according to the trial but not the
Appeal Court) because the mark’s prominence would
alert the consumer to the difference.40
The points raised in Pepkor do highlight the fact that
the scope of the Adidas trade mark monopoly resulting
from the Australian approach is arguably quite broad.
Any party who uses two or four stripes in a slanting
parallel position in the instep of a shoe runs sufficient
risk to want to back off in the face of Adidas’s demands.
The Trial Court in the South African case succinctly
identified the policy difficulty with that position: “The
mark that applicants set out to register and in fact
registered encompasses 3-stripes only. It did not seek to
register any combination of 2 or 4 stripes.”41
Concluding comments
If we recall that Adidas has a number of trade marks
relating to three stripes on an array of sports clothing,
and that it has expanded the category of sports clothes
into the realm of day-to-day wear and fashion, it is
apparent that what is a trade mark monopoly in a badge
of origin starts to look more like an effective monopoly
in a certain fashionable look or design. The question
then arises of whether the overlap with other regimes
(copyright and designs) is more overtly geared to that
policy purpose. If any clothing manufacturer or supplier,
and not only just in the sporting gear and apparel section
of the market (if such a sector still exists), has to worry
about two to four parallel stripes positioned either on the
outside of a short or long sleeve, the outside of pants,
shorts and skirts, the side beneath the arm of T-shirts,
blouses and jackets, and shoes, then one must wonder
whether the realm of trade marks law has not expanded
too far. However, this might simply be the necessary
implication of accepting that a sign can perform both a
badge of origin and a decorative function in trade marks
law — and that this idea is in step with real trends and
needs in the fashion industry.
But the matter does not end there, as Adidas’s mark
has become accepted as a “well-known mark” in a
number of jurisdictions. “Well-known” when used in
relation to a registered mark is a technical term which
implies more effective legal protection in relation to use
of a registered mark on different goods. In the case of
Adidas, the “power” of its exclusive rights over three
stripes on shoes, clothing and apparel thus starts to
penetrate into unrelated goods sectors.
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